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Editor’s Preface 
 
Achille Basile 
 
 
 
 
 
This book collects some recent contributions of Ciro Tarantino to math-
ematical research in infinite dimensional spaces. 
Spaces of infinite dimension have played an increasing role in the last 
four decades concerning their applications in models both for economics 
and for finance. The intertemporal allocation of resources, commodity dif-
ferentiation, uncertainty, dynamics of the fundamental variables of financial 
markets, are some of the issues that can be properly captured by means of 
the mathematical techniques that are typical in such spaces. 
The contribution devoted to fairness properties of some kind of alloca-
tions that emerge in very general models of markets, the so-called mixed 
markets, mainly focuses on the absence of envy among coalitions of agents. 
Naturally the object of envy is something that can be subject to trade and 
not some moral entity (like beauty, say, or some other natural talent). Due to 
the exchange activities economic agents move from an initial endowment of 
goods to a new feasible one and may be possible that a group of agents en-
vies the net trade of another coalition. When an allocation represents an ef-
ficient redistribution of resources and do not exhibit envy among coalitions, 
then we say that it is coalitionally fair, definitely a socially desirable proper-
ty. Are competitive equilibria coalitionally fair? Is it the case that coalition 
proof allocations, namely the Core allocation, are also robust with respect to 
this further stability property? These are the themes addressed by Tarantino 
in Coalitional fairness with many agents and commodities. The answers that 
are provided improve the previous results that are known in the literature. 
Here markets consider the possibility of the interaction of oligopolies and 
price takers, under different level of information about the future states of 
the world and with reference to infinite dimensional random consumption. 
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Joint with Canale, in Embedding and compactness results for multiplica-
tion operators in Sobolev spaces, Tarantino, by means of a multiplicative em-
bedding of Sobolev spaces into Lebesgue spaces, is able to provide an ine-
quality of Fefferman type. Moreover the multiplicative operator is also 
shown to be compact. Here the multiplicator is a point in a Banach space 
that generalizes the concept of Morrey space.  
Clearly such results are of a more purely mathematical nature. However, 
it is worthwhile to recall that Fefferman type inequalities have been used in 
mathematical finance for example to approximate a given contingent claim 
by means of trading strategies on a multivariate semimartingale describing 
the price evolution of a certain number of assets. Morrey spaces are as well 
involved in applications. The interest in this case bases on the fact that we 
generalize the possibility of controlling the oscillation of functions, what 
leads to results concerning the regularity of the abstract solutions of the rel-
evant partial differential equations. 
9Coalitional fairness with many agents and commodities 
 
 
Ciro Tarantino 
 
 
Abstract: We investigate fairness properties of Rational expectations equilibria (RE equilib-
ria) in economies with uncertainty and asymmetric information. We consider mixed mod-
els consisting of a set of atoms and an atomless sector interpreted, respectively, as traders 
that are large and small in terms of their influence on the market. Moreover, we assume that 
infinitely many commodities are present on the market. We provide characterizations of RE 
equilibria as allocations that are ex-post coalitionally fair. 
Keywords: Asymmetric information; Ex-post core; c-fair allocations; Rational expectations 
equilibria. 
JEL class. C71, D43, D51, D82.  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In this paper we investigate economic equity and fairness properties of 
Rational expectations equilibria in mode..ls of exchange economies with un-
certainty and asymmetric information. The existing literature on fair alloca-
tions has established, in the case of complete information economies, several 
version of the equivalence between the fair and the competitive allocations 
(see H. R. Varian, Equity, Envy; J. J. Gabszewicz, Coalitional Fairness; B. 
Shitovitz, Coalitional fair and L. Zhou, Strictly fair). The study of equity and 
fairness notions has been initiated in the seminal papers by D. Foley, Re-
source allocation. and H. R. Varian, Equity, Envy. where an allocation of re-
sources is said to be (individually) fair if it is both efficient and envy-free. It 
is said to be envy-free if no agent prefers or envies another agent's bundle to 
his own. It is an immediate fact that equal income competitive allocations 
are fair (see H. R. Varian, Equity Envy). But in general the converse is not 
true, even in large economies. In the attempt of fully characterizing the set of 
equal-income competitive allocations, various concepts of fairness have 
been introduced and investigated. In particular, the notion of envy is ex-
 
 Acknowledgments: Author acknowledges the financial support of PRIN 20103S5RN3 “Robust decision making in 
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mail: ctarant@unina.it.	
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tended in H. R. Varian, Equity Envy. from individual to coalitions (see also 
K. Vind, Lecture notes). An allocation is said to be coalitionally envy-free if 
no coalition envies any other coalition. It is said to be coalitionally fair if it is 
both efficient and coalitionally envy-free. The comparison between agents is 
made on a coalitional basis instead of an individual one, since each coalition 
of agents is required to compare its aggregate bundle to the aggregate bundle 
of any other coalition with the same size. It turns out that, under this strong-
er notion of equity, competitive allocations with equal-income coincide with 
the intersection of the sets of coalitionally fair allocations of all replica econ-
omies. Based on the notion of net trade, a different property of coalitional 
fairness has been investigated in J. J. Gabszewicz, Coalitional Fairness. and 
B. Shitovitz, Coalitional fair. For a given allocation of commodities among 
the traders, the net trade of agent t is the vector )()( tetx   , where )(tx  is 
the bundle received by t  and )(te  the initial endowment of t  . An allocation 
is said to be coalitionally fair if no coalition 1S  can benefit from the aggre-
gate net trade of some other disjoint coalition 2S  . That is, no coalition 
could redistribute among its members the net trade of a disjoint coalition in 
such a way that each of its members is better off. As a consequence, the 
market is endowed with a form of stability deriving from the fact that no co-
alition envies the net trade of any other. It is an immediate property that 
competitive allocations are coalitionally fair and that coalitionally fair alloca-
tions are in the core. Hence, as a consequence of core equivalence theorems, 
it is proved that in the case of large nonatomic economies, coalitionally fair 
allocations coincide with core allocations and, consequently, with the com-
petitive ones. When the set of atoms is non empty, these inclusions may be 
strict J. J. Gabszewicz, Coalitional Fairness. Therefore, the study of coalition-
ally fair allocations and the investigation of fairness properties of competi-
tive allocations deserve particular interest in the case of mixed models con-
sisting of a set of atoms and of an atomless sector. This problem is investi-
gated in our paper in the general framework of exchange economies with 
uncertainty and asymmetric information. Moreover, we do not limit consid-
eration to finitely many commodities, but infinitely many commodities are 
taken into account. 
The uncertainty is represented by a measurable space of events; in our 
model we only consider the case of a finite set of possible states of nature, 
then only finitely many events may occur. Agents have different information 
regarding the events, in the sense that not only they are not aware of which 
state of nature will realize, but they also have different prior beliefs. Uncer-
tainty is reflected on the initial endowments and on the utility functions that 
Ciro Tarantino, Coalitional fairness with many agents and commodities 
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depend on the state of nature which will be realized. The information of 
each agent is described by a partition of the set of states of nature. Each atom 
of this partition is an event; when a state occurs, the agent only observes the 
event containing the true state, but he cannot distinguish among states be-
longing to the same atom. 
On the commodity space side, we deal with the general case of ordered 
Banach spaces. Economic problems involving stochastic and dynamic mod-
els, naturally lead to the consideration of infinite dimensional commodity 
spaces. It is due to G. Debreu, Valuation Equilibrium, the first examination 
of validity of welfare theorems in economies with infinitely many private 
goods. In a subsequent contribution, C. D. Aliprantis et al., Equilibria in 
markets. placed such economic models in the general framework of Riesz 
spaces. From a technical point of view, we remark that our results do not re-
quire a lattice structure on the commodity space. On the other hand, the 
general representation adopted in the paper makes us unable to use standard 
version of Lyapunov's theorem in our main characterizations. Indeed, this 
convexity result fails to be true not only for the restriction of resource allo-
cations on the atomic part of the market (i.e. on large traders), but also for 
their restriction on the atomless sector (i.e. on negligible traders). 
Dealing with general mixed models, coalitional fairness properties of Ra-
tional expectation equilibria (RE equilibria) are derived by means of an arti-
ficial family of complete information economies associated to the original 
economy. It is proved that ex-post coalitionally fair allocations coincide with 
the selections from the coalitionally fair correspondence of the associated 
complete information economies. Moreover, assuming that each trader 
knows his utility function, it is true that RE equilibrium allocations are ex-
actly the selections from the competitive equilibrium correspondence of the 
associated complete information economies. As a consequence, we show 
that in general atomless models of economies with asymmetric information 
RE equlibrium allocations coincide with ex-post coalitionally fair alloca-
tions. Similar characterizations are discussed for the case of monopolistic 
economies or models with several large traders. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the model 
and the main assumptions. In Section 3 we study relations among the main 
equilibrium notions with reference to a general mixed model of exchange 
economy with differential information. In Section 4 we study fairness prop-
erties of RE equilibrium allocations. 
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2. The differential information economy setting 
 
We shall deal with a pure exchange economy with uncertainty and differ-
ential information. The mathematical model describing uncertainty is 
standard: a measurable space ),( F  where the set   denotes the possible 
states of nature and the algebra F  (of subsets of  ) represents the family of 
all possible events. There are finitely many possible states of nature. 
Agents are not endowed with the same information regarding the states 
of the world. Different agents t  may have different information algebras tF  
generated by a partition t  of   made of elements of F  . According to the 
usual interpretation: if the prevailing state is   , the only information avail-
able to t  is that the unique event )(t  of t  to whom   belongs, pre-
vails. Without any possibility to distinguish among states belonging to the 
same element of the partition. 
The space of agents is an arbitrary complete finite measure space 
),,,( TT  being T  the   -algebra of all coalitions whose economic weight 
on the market is given by the measure   . It follows that in this way we can 
simultaneously cover the discrete economy case (T  is finite and the meas-
ure   is the counting measure), the nonatomic" case of economies with in-
finitely many agents, each with no influence on the market (this type of 
economy is usually described by the interval [0,1] with the Lebesgue  -
algebra and the Lebesgue measure on it) or even the case of mixed markets 
(in the measure space there are atoms together with a nonatomic part), 
namely the case with both many uninfluential and some influential agents 
(or oligopolies) acting on the market. 
In the case of a mixed market, we assume that 10 TTT   , where 1T  is 
the set of atoms and 0T  the atomless part of T  . 
For what concerns the commodity space, with the aim of taking into ac-
count different kinds of models, for example to allow for infinite variations 
of the goods, or an infinite time horizon, we do not impose any restriction 
about its dimension. We represent it by a separable ordered Banach space 
BI  whose positive cone BI  has non-empty norm interior. Physical com-
modities to be consumed are points in the positive cone BI  . Due to uncer-
tainty, agents consume random commodities  BIx  .  
A consumption profile or assignment is defined next. 
 
Definition 1. An assignment is a function x associating to each agent in 
any state of the world an element of his consumption set  
Ciro Tarantino, Coalitional fairness with many agents and commodities 
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 BITx :  
 such that 
 
 the function txtx :),(   is F  --measurable for each Tt  ; 
 the function  xx :),(   is   --integrable on T  for each   . 
 
Further characteristics of an agent are: 
 
 a state-dependent utility function tu  representing his preference:  
IRBIut  :  
where ),( xut   is F  --measurable for all Tt  and for all  BIx  1 and, for 
each   , ),( tu  is continuous, strictly increasing and strictly quasi-
concave on BI . 
  
 an initial endowment contingent to the state of nature  
 BIet :  
and tF  --measurable This allows to take into account the private infor-
mation of the agent t  , in such a way that t  does not obtain any additional 
information about states of nature belonging to the same element of t  , i.e. 
those states which are indistinguishable for agent t  . 
For each   the function )(te  is assumed to be   --integrable with re-
spect to t in the sense of Bochner and such that  detT )(  is a strictly posi-
tive vector. 
We always write integrability to mean Bochner integrability. 
 
We say that an assignment is an allocation if for each   ,  
.  dedx TT    
 
We denote by E  our differential information economy, i.e. the following col-
lection:  
 
1We assume the )( BT  -measurability of the mapping ),(),( xuxt t   for any   . B  is the 
Borel   -algebra of BI   
On some methods and applications of ordered Banach spaces 
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}.),,(;);,,();,{( Ttttt euBIT  TFE  
To a differential information economy E  , we associate a family of com-
plete information economies )}({E  by fixing for each state   the initial 
endowment ),( e  and the utility functions Tttu )),((   . 
 
 
3. Coalitional fairness 
 
Let us take an economy E  , an allocation x and a coalition S of agents. 
 
Definition 2. We say that the allocation x is blocked ex--post by the coa-
lition S  in the state o  if there exists an assignment y such that  
 
;),(),( 00  dtedty SS    
. a.a.for  )),(,()),(,( 0000 Sttxutyu tt    
 
Definition 3. An allocation x is an ex--post core allocation if there exists 
no coalition that blocks it in any state of nature. The set of all ex--post core al-
locations, the ex--post core of E  , is denoted by )(EC  (cf. Einy et al., Rational 
expectations). 
 
We move now our attention to a notion of coalitional fairness inspired to 
J. J. Gabszewicz, Coalitional Fairness. and already adapted by C. Donnini et 
al., Coalitional fairness. in differential information economies with reference 
to the interim case. 
Let us take an allocation x  . Suppose that, corresponding to a non-
negligible coalition 1S  , we find a disjoint coalition 2S  , an assignment y  
and a state 0  such that 
2)  )),(,()),(,( 0000 txutyu tt    for a.a. 1St  ; 
3)   dtetxdtety SS ][][ ),(),(),(),( 0000 21   . 
It seems natural to say, under the above circumstances, that agents of 1S  
in the state 0  discover ex-post that they envy the net trade2 of coalition 2S  . 
Indeed, they could redistribute it among themselves becoming better off. 
 
2If x  is an allocation and S a coalition, the vector  dexS ],[   is the net trade of coalition S  at  . 
Ciro Tarantino, Coalitional fairness with many agents and commodities 
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We may well say, then, that under x there is an enviuos coalition. Conse-
quently, the allocation x will be said ex-post c-fair (in the sense of Gabsze-
wicz) if there are no envious coalitions. 
 
The formal definitions follow below. 
 
Definition 4. Given two disjoint coalitions 1S  and 2S  , an allocation x  is 
ex--post coalitionally fair (c-fair) relative to 1S  and 2S  (or it does not show 
ex--post envy relative to 1S  and 2S  ), if there exist no state of nature 0  
and no assignment y  , such that for some i  , 2,1i  : 
1)  0)( iS  ; 
2)  )),(,()),(,( 0000 txutyu tt    for a.a. iSt  ; 
3)  ijdexdey
ji SS
   ][][ 0000  . 
Definition 5. Given a class S  of coalitions, an allocation x  is an ex--post 
c-fair allocation with respect to S  if it doesn't show ex--post envy relative to 
1S  and 2S  , whenever 1S  and 2S  belong to S  . 
 
The set of all ex-post c-fair allocations with respect to S  is denoted by S  
- )(EC fair  . The set of all ex-post c-fair allocations with respect to T  is short-
ly denoted by )(EC fair  and we usually omit to say with respect to T  . If no 
ex--post envy emerges relative to any possible pair of disjoint coalitions 
21, SS  with 11 SS  and 22 SS  , then we speak of c--fairness with respect to 
the classes 1S  and 2S  of coalitions. 
 
It follows directly from the definitions that 
 
Proposition 6. Any ex--post coalitionally fair allocation in T  is in the ex--
post core:  
)(EC fair  )(EC   
Proof: We suppose that x  is in )(EC fair  , but it does not belong to the ex-
post core. Then, there exist a coalition A  and an assignment y  such that in 
a fixed state of nature A  blocks x  . Setting AS 1  and 2S  empty we get a 
contradiction.  
  
The inclusion above cannot be reversed in general. In the case of complete 
information economies, this is shown to be true in J. J. Gabszewicz, Coali-
tional Fairness Proposition 2. For atomless economies, however, ex-post 
On some methods and applications of ordered Banach spaces 
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core and ex-post c-fair allocations do coincide since one can properly extend 
both J. J. Gabszewicz, Coalitional Fairness, Theorem 1 and E. Einy et al, Ra-
tional expectations, Theorem 3.1.  
In general mixed market with infinitely many commodities, generalizing 
J. J. Gabszewicz, Coalitional Fairness, Theorem 2, one can show that  
 
Theorem 7. Let x be a strictly positive ex--post core allocation. Then x is 
ex--post coalitionally fair with respect to }|{ 00 TSS  TT  and 
}|{ 11 TSS  TT  .  
 
The result can be interpreted by saying that, in a market economy with 
many commodities and atoms, under a core allocation coalitions of negligi-
ble traders do not envy ex--post coalitions containing all large traders and 
conversely.  
First, observe that analogously to E. Einy et al, Rational expectations, 
Theorem 3.1, we can obtain the following characterization:  
 
Theorem 8. Let E  be an economy. For any class of coalitions S  , we get  
 
}.))((-),( and assignment an is |{)(-   ECSECS fairfair xxx  
 
Then we proceed with the proof of Theorem 7. 
 
Proof of Theorem 7: Since both, ex--post core and c--fair allocations are 
selections (E. Einy et al, Rational expectations., Theorem 3.1 and Theorem 
8), it is enough to prove the statement for an economy with complete infor-
mation or, in other words, to extend J. J. Gabszewicz, Coalitional Fairness, 
Theorem 2 to the case of a general commodity space BI  for which int( BI  
) is non-empty.  
Let, then, 01 TS  , 12 TS  , y  be such that 0)( 1 S  , ))(())(( txutyu tt   , a.e. in 1S  and  dexdey SS )()( 21   . Consider 
the assignment )(21 yxz   . We have that it is strictly positive and ))(())(( txutzu tt   , a.e. in 1S  . Moreover  
.)(2
1)(2
1)(2
1)(
21111
 dexdeydexdez
SSSSS
    
 
Since 0
1
 dzS  and by continuity of preferences, there exist 0  and 
a subset C  of 1S  such that ))(())(( txutzu tt   , a.e. in C  . Define the func-
Ciro Tarantino, Coalitional fairness with many agents and commodities 
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tion z  to be the same as z  on CS 1  and equal to z  on C  . Then ))(())(( txutzu tt   , a.e. in 1S  and  
,
111 \
 dzdzdzdz
SCSCS    
 so  
.)(2
1)()(
2111
 dexdezdez
SSSS
    
 Since 0)()(:
1212
1    dezdexv SSS   
we can take 0  in such a way that the disk centered in v  and radius   is 
fully contained into int )( BI  .  
Observe now that since x  is a core allocation, the monotonicity gives that 
the feasibility actually guarantees  edxd TT   . Now, if the set 21 SS   
exhausts T  , then the integral dexSS )(21    is zero and 0)(1  dezS  
gives the feasibility of z  , namely we violate that x  is in the core. We can 
therefore assume that the set )( 21 SST   , which does not contain atoms, 
is of positive   -measure. By the relative convexity of the range of the inte-
gral function over 0T  , we find a set  
.)(2
1)(with)( )(\21 21     dexdexSSTS SSTS  
Define s  to be the same as z  on the coalition 1S  and the same as x  on 
S  , then ))(())(( txutsu tt   , a.e. in SS 1  and ))(())(( txutsu tt   , a.e. in 
1S  . Moreover  
   ))(21)(()( 2111  dexdezdes SSSSS  
.))(2
1)(2
1)( )(\ 21     dexdexdex TSSTS  
 It follows that 0)(
1
  desSS  
so we can take a vector 0w  such that  dedsw SSSS   11  . Finally, 
modifying s  by taking )(Swx   instead of x  on S  , we violate that x  is in 
the core since the coalition SS 1  blocks x  via the new assignment s . In-
deed ))(())(( txutsu tt  , a.e. in SS 1  and 
.
111
 dewdxdzds SSSSSS     
For the case where 11 TS  , 02 TS  a similar proof applies.  
On some methods and applications of ordered Banach spaces 
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4. Fairness of Rational Expectations equilibria 
  
We analyze now coalitional fairness of rational expectations equilibria of 
the economy E  .  
In this context agents restrict their consumption choices to budget sets 
defined as follows:  
)},,()()(:{),( tepapBIapBt     
 for the agent t  , in the state   and with respect to a prevailing system of 
prices p  belonging to }F:)({  measurable  ispBIp  3. More-
over, since agents evaluate choices with a state by state comparison of the 
conditional expectation of their utility, taking into account both private in-
formation and the information revealed by prices, we assume that every 
agent t  is given with a strictly positive probability over F  . Consequently we 
denote, with reference to such probability, by )|( GfEt  the conditional ex-
pectation of an F  -measurable function f  given the subalgebra G  of F  .  
We denote by )( p  the smallest  -algebra of F  that makes the function 
p  measurable ( )( p  represents the information contained in p  ). F  being 
generated by a partition   , the   --algebra )( p  is generated by the parti-
tion of   , coarser than   , in its turn generated by the function p  . In this 
case, moreover, )|( GfEt  is a G  --measurable random variable having the 
same mean of f  on the elements of the partition that generates G  .  
 
Definition 9. A rational expectations equilibrium (RE equilibrium) is a 
pair ),( xp  where p  is a price system, and x  is an allocation such that:  
(i) ),( tx   is ))(( tp F -measurable for all Tt  ;  
(ii) ),(),( pBtx t    for each   and for each Tt  ;  
(iii) almost everywhere in T  , if y is ))(( tp F  --measurable and 
satisfies ),()( pBy t    for each   , then  
 
))(|))(,(())(|)),(,(( tttttt pyuEptxuE FF    
 
pointwise on   .  
 
 
3Here we use standard notation for the topological dual of BI  , its positive cone and the duality mapping. 
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In the above definition, the private information tF  of agent t  is refined 
by means of the information generated by p  . In case the price reveals all 
the information, i.e. F)( p  , the RE equilibrium is said fully revealing. 
The set of allocations that are RE equilibria for a suitable price is denoted by 
)(ERE  4.  
Given the inclusions above, we see that:  
.)()( ECE fairRE   
 therefore, a RE equilibrium needs not be coalitionally fair. This can only 
happen when agents do not know their utility functions. In fact, we shall 
show next that assuming the functions ),( tu   to be tF  --measurable, then 
any RE equilibrium allocation is ex--post coalitionally fair. 
 
Theorem 10. Assume that in the economy E  the functions ),( xut   are tF  -
-measurable. Then  
.)()( ECE fairRE   
Proof: Let ))(( EW  be the Walrasian allocations of )(E  , the using A. 
De Simone et al, Some, Theorem 11 and Theorem 8, we have to prove that  
 }))((),( and assignment an is |{  EWxxx  
  
}))((),( and assignment an is |{   EC fairxxx  
 So, it is sufficient to show that in a complete information economy any 
Walrasian allocation is also coalitionally fair, i.e.  
.fixedany for ))(())((   ECE fairW  
 Let us consider a fixed state of nature 0  and the corresponding deter-
ministic information economy )( 0E . Let x  be a competitive allocation in ))(( 0EW , and assume by way of contradiction that ))(( 0EC fairx . A 
contradiction easily follows like in J. J. Gabszewicz, Coalitional Fairness.     
  
In the case of atomless economies, under suitable hypotheses, RE equilib-
rium allocations are exactly ex-post c-fair allocations.  
 
 
4In E. Einy et al, Rational expectations, Example 4.2, an economy is constructed with a RE equilibrium, which can 
be blocked by an ex--post core allocation. 
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Theorem 11. Let us assume that the set 1T  of large traders is empty. More-
over, for any agent and any state, suppose that ),( xut   are tF  --measurable. 
Then  
.)()( ECE fairRE   
Proof: Only the inclusion )()( ECE fairRE   has to be justified. But if x  
is an ex--post c-fair allocation, and therefore in the ex--post core, then E. 
Einy et al, Rational expectations., Theorem 3.1, applies. So fix a state   . 
Hence, ))((),(  ECx   and using the core equivalence Theorem in A. 
Rustichini et al, Edgeworth’s conjecture, we have ))((),(  EWx   and by A. 
De Simone et al, Some new characterization, Theorem 11, )(EREx  .  
  
In the case of mixed markets one has to observe that ex--post c-fair allo-
cation need not be RE equilibrium allocations in general. Such a result is too 
strong for oligopolistic models ( 1T  non-empty), even in the case of complete 
information economies (see J. J. Gabszewicz, Coalitional Fairness, Proposi-
tion 2). If 1T  consists of a single atom, it is possible to prove that the RE 
equilibrium allocations are exactly ex-post c-fair allocations with respect to 
the class of coalitions which do not contain the atom. 
  
 
Theorem 12. Let E  be a mixed market with only one atom, 1||.. 1 Tei  . 
Moreover, for any agent and any state, suppose that ),( xut   are tF  --measur-
able. Then  
)(-)( 0 ECTE fairRE  . 
  
Proof: By Theorem 8 we can write  
 
.}))((-),( and assignment an is |{)(- 00   ECTECT fairfair xxx
 
Let us fix a state   . Using the weak form of Lyapunov's convexity theo-
rem, we can reproduce the proof of B. Shitovitz, Coalitional fair, Corollary 
A*, and obtain that  
 
.}))((),( and assignment an is |{)(-0   EECT Wxxxfair  
 
The statement follows by E. Einy et al, Rational expectations, Theorem 
4.3.  
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So, in the case of just one large trader, under a RE equilibrium allocation 
coalitions made by small traders do not envy each other ex--post. Let us dis-
cuss now the general case of mixed markets. Moving from the observation 
that core allocations are not necessarily c-fair, we have proved in Theorem 7 
that a strictly positive allocation x  which is in the ex--post core is ex-post c-
fair with respect to 0T  and 1T  . Here we wish to point out that if the (ex--
post) core allocation x  is also a restricted rational expectation equilibrium, 
then it comes out to be c-fair with respect to the class 10 TT   of coalitions. 
In the following, we limit consideration to the case of finitely many com-
modities.  
 
By a restricted equilibrium we mean what follows.  
 
Definition 13. A restricted rational expectations equilibrium (RRE equi-
librium) is a pair ),( xp  where p  is a price system, and x  is an allocation 
such that:  
(i)  ),( tx   is ))(( tp F  --measurable for all Tt  ;  
(ii)  ),()(),()( teptxp    for each   and for each 
0Tt  ;  
(iii)  almost everywhere in T  , if y is ))(( tp F  --measurable and 
satisfies )},,()()(:{:),()( txpapBIapBy t     
for each   , 
 
then  
))(|))(,(())(|)),(,(( tttttt pyuEptxuE FF    
 
 pointwise on   .  
 
The usual interpretation goes as follows: under a RRE equilibrium allo-
cation x  , there exists a price system p  such that: 1) Each trader maximizes 
(ex--post) over his/her efficiency set; 2) small traders are in a RE equilibrium 
with respect to p  . As for restricted competitive equilibria of complete in-
formation economies, in general, it is not true that the restriction of the allo-
cation x  on 0T  is a RE equilibrium, since the feasibility condition in the 
atomless sub-economy may be violated. However, RRE equilibria which are 
also in the ex-post core satisfy additional fairness properties.  
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Proposition 14. Let BI  be finite dimensional. Every strictly positive, ex--
post core allocation x  which is also a RRE equilibrium is ex--post coalitional-
ly fair with respect to 10 TT   .  
 
Proof: Let p  be the equilibrium price. Since )(ECx  , then, for any 
ˆ  , we have that ))ˆ((ˆ  ECx   and therefore ˆx  is a restricted com-
petitive equilibrium in the economy )ˆ(E  with respect to the price )ˆ(p  . 
To check latter statement it is enough to go like in the proof of E. Einy et al, 
Rational expectations…, Theorem 4.3, by taking ),ˆ( pBa t   and replacing ),ˆ(),( tete    by ),ˆ(),( txtx    . Of course the equalities 
),ˆ()ˆ(),ˆ()ˆ( teptxp    over 0T  are due to the definition of RRE equi-
librium.  
Now, ˆx  is a restricted competitive equilibrium in )ˆ(E  and also belongs 
to the core. Since we have proved the c--fairness of x  with respect to 0T  and 
1T  in Theorem 7, then the concluding argument goes like in the proof of J. J. 
Gabszewicz, Coalitional Fairness, Theorem 3. 
  
The previous result implies that under conditions ensuring that ex-post 
core allocations are RRE equilibria, the ex--post core consists of allocations 
coalitionally fair with respect to the whole class 10 TT   . Such conditions are 
well known in the case of finitely many commodities (see for example J. J. 
Gabszewicz, Coalitional Fairness, B. Shitovitz, Coalitional fair, M. G. Grazi-
ano et al, A note on the private...). We leave the identification of analogous 
conditions in the presence of infinitely many commodities as subject of fu-
ture investigation. A further line of open research is represented by the case 
in which the commodity space BI  does not exhibit interior points in its 
positive cone. Such case comprises interesting models for applications like 
investigation of infinite-horizon economies, asset pricing models, dif-
ferentiated commodity models. To cover this general case, the set of as-
sumptions imposed in section 2 will require a modification inspired by clas-
sical properness assumptions on preferences. In particular, we expect that 
the commodity space enjoys a Riesz space structure. This requirement to-
gether with the lattice structure of the price space seems to be indispensable 
to carry over lattice theoretical arguments connected with properness con-
ditions.  
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Embedding and compactness results for multiplication  
operators in Sobolev spaces 
 
 
Anna Canale and Ciro Tarantino 
 
 
Abstract: The paper deals with the operator guu   defined in the Sobolev space )(, prW  and which takes values in )(pL  when   is an unbounded open subset in 
nR  The functions g  belong to Morrey type spaces which provide an intermediate space 
between )(L  and )(plocL  . The main result is a embedding result from which we can 
deduce a Fefferman type inequality. pL  estimates and a compactness result are also stated.  
Keywords: multiplication operator, pL  estimates, compactness results. 
JEL class. 35J25, 46E35.  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Let   be an unbounded open subset in nR  . 
In literature there are different results about the study of multiplication op-
erator for a suitable function Cg :   
,guu      (1.1) 
as an operator defined in a Sobolev space (with or without weight) and 
which takes values in a )(pL  space. 
In )(,10 pW  or in )(,1 pW  with   regular enough, reference results are 
some well-known inequalities which state the boundedness of (1.1): Hardy 
type inequalities (see H. Brezis, Sobolev spaces, A. Kufner, Weighted, J. 
Nečas, Les methods) when )(xg  is an appropriate power of the distance of 
x  from a subset of   , Fefferman inequality (C. Fefferman, The uncertain-
ty principle, see, e.g. F. Chiarenza - M. Franciosi, A generalization of, F. Chi-
arenza - M. Frasca, A remark on) obtained when g  belongs to suitable Mor-
rey spaces. 
 
 
 Department of Mathematics, University of Salerno, Via Giovanni Paolo II n.132, 84084 Fisciano (Sa), Italy.E-
mail: acanale@unisa.it.	
 Department of Economics and Statistics, University of Naples "Federico II", Via Cinthia, 80126 Napoli, Italy. E-
mail:. ctarant@unina.it.	
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Our aim is to study the multiplication operator in the Sobolev space 
)(, prW  , Nr  ,  p1  when g  belongs to suitable Morrey type 
spaces )(pM  which include )(L  and which are wider than classical 
Morrey space npL ,  when nR  . We observe that the space )(pM  pro-
vides an intermediate space between )(L  and )(plocL  . 
The main results we stated concern embedding and compactness results for 
multiplication operators. 
One of the aspects of our interest in these estimates lies in the fact that this 
type of inequalities are useful tools to prove a priori bounds when studying 
elliptic equations. Furthermore a priori bounds enable us to state existence 
and uniqueness results. For some applications in the study of the a priori 
bounds see A. Canale, A priori 2003, On some results 2006, On some results 
2007, Bounds in spaces 2008, Bounds in space 2009. 
 
In Section 2 and Section 3 we introduce the spaces pM  and some suitable 
subspaces analyzing their inclusion properties and the relations between 
such spaces and the classical Morrey spaces npL ,  . In Section 4 we state the 
embedding result and pL  estimates when the functions g  belong to the sub-
spaces 
pM  and p0M  defined in Section 2. Moreover we deduce from embed-
ding result a Fefferman type result. 
The compactness result for the multiplication operator is stated in Section 5. 
 
 
2. Notations and Morrey type spaces 
 
Let nR  be the n  -dimensional real euclidean space, and )(xBr  the set  
 
,,)0(},||:{)(  RrRxBBrxyRyxB nrrnr  
 
For any nRx  , we call open infinite cone having vertex at x  every set of the 
type  
 
},||,:)({ rzyRxyx    
 
where  Rr  and nRz  are such that rxz  ||  . 
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For all [2/,0]    and for all nRx  we denote by )(xC  an open infinite 
cone having vertex at x  and opening   . 
For a fixed )(xC  , we set  
.,)()(),(  RhxBxChxC h  
 
Let   be an open set in nR  . We denote by ),,( h  the family of open 
cones C  of opening   and height h  . 
We assume that the following hypothesis is satisfied: 
 
)1h   There exists [2/,0]    such that  
.),(such that)(   xCxCx  
 
Let  xx))((   be the family of open sets in nR  defined as  
.0,,)()(   xxBx  
If  p1  we define by )(pM  as the space of functions )( plocLg  
such that  
   ,0,||||sup|||| ))((/
],0]
)(  


dgg xL
pn
d
x
pp 


M   (2.1) 
equipped with the norm defined by (2.1). Furthermore let )(pM  be the 
closure of )(L  in )(pM  and )(0 pM  the closure of )(0 C  in )(pM  . 
 
 Remark 2.1  We observe that: 
 
1. If   is a bounded open set and  diamd  , then )(pM  coin-
cides with the space )(, npL  , the classical Morrey space. 
2. If nR  then )()(,  pnpL M  . 
3. The norm (2.1) is a sort of average integral on )(xB  . To this 
end we note that if the family )}({ x  shrinks nicely to x  , that 
is if )()( xBx    for any 0  and there is a constant 0  
, independent of   , such that |)(||)(| xBx    , the meas-
ure of )(x  is equivalent to the measure of )(xB  . 
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For functions that belong to the spaces )(pM  we can state the following al-
ternative definition. Let )(  the   -algebra of Lebesgue measurable sub-
sets of   .  
 
Lemma 2.2  A function )( pg M  if and only if )( pg M  and the func-
tion 
    )(
|)(|sup
)(
||||sup1,0:
],0]





 p
n
d
x
ME
txBE
E
p
g gt 



 
 (2.2) 
 
is continuous in zero, where E  denotes the characteristic function of E  . 
 
Proof. Let g  be a function belonging to the space )(pM  and let pg  be con-
tinuous in zero. We denote by   a positive number such that 
 
   

 

 )(
],0]
|||||)(|sup),( pMEn
d
x
gxBEE  
and by r  the set 
 
.}|)(|:{)(  Rrrxgxgr    (2.3) 
 
Then there exists a positive constant Rc  , independent of r  and g  , such 
that 
 
  .)(|||||)(|sup
],0]
pr
n
d
x r
g
cxB
p
p 


M


  
If we set  
,||||
/1
)(
pp
pg
cr 


 

 
M  
we get    

  


|)(|sup
],0]
xBr
n
d
x
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and, as a consequence,  
 
.|||| )(    pkg M  
Let us introduce now the function  
 
.

 kggg   
Evidently )( Lg  and  
 
.|||||||| )()(     pkp Mggg M  
 
Conversely, let us assume )( pg M  . Then there exists )( Lg  such 
that  
 
.2/|||| )(   pgg M  
So we get  
  pn
d
xL
EMEE
xBEg
gggg ppp
/1
],0]
)(
)()()(
|)(|sup||||2/
||||||)(||||||













MM
 
  (2.4) 
from which we deduce that  
 
.|||| )  pEg M  
for any )(E  such that  
p
L
n
d
x g
Ex 






  )(],0]
||||2|)(|sup 
  
and the lemma is proved. 
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3. Inclusion properties 
 
The following Theorem states inclusion properties of the spaces )(pM  . 
 
Theorem 3.1  The following inclusions hold: 
 
a)  )()(  pL M   [,1[ p  . 
b)   qppq 1),()( MM  . 
c)  ),(~)(  pq MM    qp1  . 
 
 Proof.  
 
a) If )( Lg  we get 
  
  )(/1/
],0]
)(
))((
/
],0]
)(
|||||)(|sup||||
||||sup||||








 

L
ppn
d
xL
xL
pn
d
x
gcxg
gg pp





M
  (3.1) 
where, if n  denotes the volume of the unit ball )0(1B  , we get 
p
nc
1  . 
 
b) By Hölder inequality it follows 
 
,||||sup
)|)(|||||(sup||||
))((
],0]
1
))((
],0]
)(
11
xL
d
x
xL
d
x
q
q
n
qp
q
p
n
p
gc
xgg

















M
  (3.2) 
with qpnc
11
1
   . 
 
c) We observe that, if )( qg M  , from )b  we have )( pg M  . Fur-
thermore 
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  ,|)(|sup||||
|||||)(|sup
||||sup||||
11
11
],0]
)(
))((
/
],0]
))((
/
],0]
)(
qp
q
q
qp
pp
Exg
gEx
gg
n
d
xM
ExLp
pn
d
x
ExL
pn
d
x
E













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and we deduce that the function pg  , defined by (sigma), is continu-
ous in zero.  
From Lemma 2.2 it follows that )( pg M  . 
 
 
4. Embedding result 
 
Let us consider the function 
 

 
 ).(if0
)(if1),(:
xy
xy
yx

    (4.1) 
and, for any x  , we set 
 
)}.(:{)( yxyxE       (4.2) 
 
 
Lemma 4.1  For any x  , )(xE  is a measurable set and there exist 
 Rcc 21,  such that 
 
.|)(| 21  xcxEc nn      (4.3) 
 
 
Proof. Clearly the function   is a measurable function. Then, for any fixed 
y  , the function ),(: yxxy    is measurable. Since y  is the 
characteristic function of )(yE  , we have that )(yE  is measurable. 
Now we prove that (4.3) holds. The inequality on the right is easily proved. 
We will prove the inequality on the left. 
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Let us consider ),(  xC  such that ),(  xC  . We get  
 
).(),( xExC   
 
In fact let ),(  xCy  . Then there exists a cone ),,( hC   such that 
Cyx ,  . So  
 
).(),( xEyyBx    
 
Thus the inequality (4.3) is stated. 
 
Now we state a Lemma which we will use in the proof of the embedding re-
sult. 
 
 
Lemma 4.2  If )1h  holds, then we have )(1  Lv  if and only if the map 
))((1|||| xLn vx    belongs to )(1 L  . Therefore there exist  Rcc 21,  
such that 
 
).(|||||||||||| 1)(2))(()(1 111    Lvvcdxvvc LxLnL   (4.4) 
 
 
Proof. The result is a consequence of the relation 
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 (4.5) 
and of the Lemma 4.1. 
 
 
Let qpr ,,  be real number with the condition 
.1if,,1,)2  pr
n
r
nq
r
nqqpNrh  
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Let )(,  prWu  . For any x  we set  
 
.))(()(,: * xxxyxy pxx    
 
.))(()(:)( xzxuxzuu x     
We note that  
)).((, xWu pr     
We also note that, in consequence of )1h   )(x  has the cone property, 
with the characteristic cone having height and opening independent of x  . 
On the other hand, if pq /  , from )2h  we get  
.11,1if1,1
n
r
pp
p
r
n  
  
From well-known embedding theorems of Sobolev spaces (see, e.g., R.A. 
Adams, Sobolev ……), we deduce that  
))((1 xLu p    

 
and the following bound holds 
 
,|||||||| ))((0))(( ,1 xWxL prp ucu  


 


     (4.6) 
where ),,,(00 nrqpcc   is a constant independent of x  and u  . 
From (4.6) easily it follows that 
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  (4.7) 
 
Theorem 4.3  If )1h  and )2h  hold, then for any )( qg M  and for any )(,  prWu  we get )( pLgu  and 
 
,|||||||||||| )()()( ,   prqp WL ugcgu M     (4.8) 
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 where the constant ),,,( nrqpcc   is independent of g  and u  . 
 
Proof.  Let )(,  prWu  and )( qg M  . By (4.4) and by Hölder inequality 
it follows that 
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On the other hand from (4.7) and Lemma (4.2) we obtain 
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 (4.10) 
From (4.9) and (4.10) the inequality (4.8) follows. 
 
The following theorem is a consequence of the embedding result stated in 
the Theorem 4.3 (see result of C. Fefferman, The uncertainty, and also F. 
Chiarenza - M. Frasca, A remark on, for a simplified proof). 
 
 
 Theorem 4.4 If )1h  and )2h  hold then for any )( qg M  , we get  
).(|||||||||||| ,10)()()(   pLL Wuugcgu pqp M  
where the constant ),,( nqpcc   is independent of g  and u  . 
Proof. Taking in mind the Poincaré inequality, the proof is a direct conse-
quence of the Theorem 4.3 when 1r  . 
 
The pL  estimates below are obtained when the function g  belongs to the 
closure of )(L  in )(qM  or to the closure of )(0 C  in )(qM  . In the 
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applications to the elliptic differential equations we deal with multiplication 
operators belonging to these spaces. 
 
Lemma 4.5  If )1h  , )2h  hold and )( qg M  , then for any  R  there 
exists  Rc )(  such that  
).(||||)(|||||||| ,)()()( ,   prLWL Wuucugu pprp   
 
 Proof. Let )( L  such that  
,/|||| )( cg q   M       (4.11) 
where the constant c  is the constant in the bound (4.8). Then by Theorem 
4.3 
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 with )(||||)(  Lc   . 
 
Lemma 4.6  If )1h  , )2h  hold and )(0  qg M  , then for any  R  there 
exist  Rc )(  and an open set   with cone property such that 
 
).(||||)(|||||||| ,)()()( ,   prLWL Wuucugu pprp    (4.13) 
 
Proof.  Let )(0  C  be such that (4.11) holds. 
Reasoning as in the proof of the Lemma 4.5 we get 
 
,||||)(|||||||| sup,)()( ,  ppWL ucugu prp       (4.14) 
 
with )(c  as in the Lemma 4.5. 
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Then let us fix [2/,0]    and [2/)supp,(dist,0]  h  . If we denote 
by   the open set of nR  union of the cones ),,(  hC   such that 
gC supp  is not empty, then (4.13) follows from (4.14). 
 
 
5. Compactness result 
 
Now we state the compactness result. 
 
Theorem 5.1 If )1h  , )2h  hold and )(0  qg M  , then the operator  
 
)()(,  ppr LguWu  
is compact. 
 
Proof.  We remark that for any open set   the operator  
 
)(|)( ,,   prpr WuWu  
 
is linear and bounded. 
On the other hand, if   verifies the cone property too, by Rellich-
Kondrachov's theorem the operator  
 
)()'(,  ppr LuWu  
 
is compact. Then also the operator  
)(|)(,   ppr LuWu  
is compact. Therefore if )(}{ ,  prn Wu  is a bounded sequence there exists 
a subsequence }{
kn
u  converging to u  in )(pL  . By Lemma 4.6 we get  
)(||||)(||||||)(|| ,)()()( ,   prLnWnLn Wuuucuuuug pkprkpk   
 
from which we can deduce the result. 
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